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READING, WRITING, AND RACE:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EDUCATIONAL
STRATEGIES DESIGNED TO TEACH RACIAL LITERACY
Michael J. Kaufman *
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a social studies class in a public high school. The class
has twenty students, ten of whom are white and ten of whom are
African-American. The classroom contains ten desks on the east
side of the room, which are separated from ten desks on the west
side of the room by an aisle. On the first day of class, the ten Afri-
can-American students choose to sit together in the ten desks on
the east side of the room, while the ten white students choose to
sit together on the west side of the room. The next day, the
teacher decides to reassign five white students to desks on the
east side of the room, and five African-Americans to desks on the
west side of the room. The teacher believes that racial integration
within the classroom is instrumental to one of the critical learn-
ing outcomes of the class: teaching racial literacy. The teacher
has employed race-conscious student assignment as an educa-
tional strategy designed to teach racial literacy.
Under the Supreme Court's equal protection cases, however,
such educational judgments will be strictly scrutinized and pre-
sumed to be unconstitutional by judges who have no educational
expertise. In fact, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
heard arguments to resolve questions about the constitutionality
of such race-conscious student assignment decisions by public sec-
ondary school officials in the Seattle, Washington and Jefferson
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Director of the Childlaw and Education Insti-
tute and Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago. I would like to thank Timothy
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County, Kentucky School Districts.1 In considering whether race-
conscious educational strategies violate the Equal Protection
Clause, the Supreme Court effectively presumes that any deci-
sions made by public educational organizations that treat stu-
dents differently because of their race are unconstitutional. The
presumption can be rebutted only if the organization or the pro-
fessional establishes that the differential treatment is narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling interest. Although both the Seat-
tle District and Jefferson County Public Schools assign students
to particular schools based on a host of considerations, there is no
doubting that at least some students have been assigned to their
preferred school because of their race and other students have
been assigned to a non-preferred school because of their race. The
issue presented by such programs is whether a public school dis-
trict's use of a student's race in deciding to assign that student to
1. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162
(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006); McFarland v. Jefferson
County Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004), affd, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir.
2005). After a history of racial segregation, the Jefferson County Public Schools in Ken-
tucky were ordered to maintain an integrated school system. The schools did so for 25
years. After they were released from the federal court decree, the schools chose to attempt
to maintain their integrated status through a student assignment plan that considers a
student's race together with a "myriad of other factors," including residence, school capac-
ity, program popularity, student choice, and random draw. McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at
837-48.
The Seattle School District No. 1 was never the subject of a judicial decree requiring
remedial action to dismantle racially segregated schools. Rather, the District voluntarily
sought to avoid the racial segregation in its schools that resulted from school assignment
based on proximity from home to school. The District adopted an open choice plan whereby
students could apply to any one of the District's ten schools. Each student ranks at least
one, but not necessarily all of the District's high schools in the order of the student's pref-
erence. If there is capacity in the student's preferred school, the district assigns the stu-
dent to that school. When a school becomes oversubscribed, however, the District gives
preferential treatment to students who have siblings already attending the requested
school. If the school is still oversubscribed, the district then considers the race of the stu-
dent together with the racial composition of the school in making its school assignment. If
the racial composition of a particular high school significantly (initially by 10% or more,
and eventually by 15% or more) deviates from the demography of the Seattle district's
overall student population (which is about 40% white and 60% nonwhite), and if the as-
signment of the student would bring the school's demography closer to the Seattle dis-
trict's overall student demography, then the student would be assigned to that school. Af-
ter all of the students whose admission to a particular school would bring that school's
racial demography closer to the Seattle district's racial demography have been admitted to
an oversubscribed school, the district then assigns students to that school based on the
distance between their residence and the school. A student who resides as little as one
hundredth of a mile closer to the school than another student will be given priority. Fi-
nally, if after considering students' choice, facilities capacity, racial demography and prox-
imity, the District still has space for students in an oversubscribed school, assignment to
that school is based on a lottery. Seattle, 426 F.3d at 1167, 1169-70.
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a particular school, classroom or desk within the district, violates
the Equal Protection Clause.
In Section II, this article first shows that such race-conscious
decision making should satisfy even the Supreme Court's current,
strict equal protection scrutiny. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that states have a compelling interest in encouraging their
educational institutions to provide "educational benefits" to their
citizens.2 This article demonstrates that a school district's use of
student assignment to produce a meaningful number of diverse
students within a school, or classroom, is narrowly tailored to
achieve the compelling governmental interest in teaching racial
literacy.
Many public school districts, including Seattle and Jefferson
County, have determined that their students are benefited by
educational strategies designed to teach about race. They have
reached the educational judgment that their district's curriculum
and instructional practices should be designed to help their stu-
dents learn "racial literacy." The concept of racial literacy in-
cludes several objectives: an understanding of the biological and
social components of race itself; an understanding of the history
of race throughout the world and in America; an understanding of
the current and projected racial composition of the world, the
country, the state, the county, the school district and the school;
an understanding of the relationship vel non between race and
politics, law, society, geography, language, culture, religion, fam-
ily and education; an understanding of the connection vel non be-
tween race and perceptions of the world and one's self; an under-
standing of the racial prejudices and biases that may exist in
each student; an understanding of the strategies that may be
used to overcome such prejudices and biases; and an understand-
ing of the value of racial differences and racial tolerance.3
2. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244, 275 (2003).
3. In From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and
the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. AM. HIS. I 56-60 (June 2004), available at http://
www.historycooperative.org/journals/jah/91.1/guinier.html, Lani Guinier has defined "ra-
cial literacy" in the different context of developing a sophisticated understanding and reac-
tion to race in America. She writes that "racial literacy as epiphenomenal. .. is contextual
rather than universal ... depends on the engagement between action and thought ... is
about learning rather than knowing ... is an interactive piocess in which race functions
as a tool of diagnosis, feedback and assessment." Id. at 1 56-58.
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Racial literacy is hardly a novel educational objective. John
Dewey concluded that encouraging students to understand and
confront racial differences is a particularly critical function to be
performed by education in American democracy.4 Educational
philosophers and practitioners have long recognized that because
of the pervasiveness of racial issues throughout the curriculum,
students must receive an educational foundation in racial liter-
acy.5 Moreover, local public school districts, under direction from
their states, commonly include instruction in race as a required
component of their curriculum and instructional practices.6 The
Jefferson County and Seattle School Districts, for example, spe-
cifically affirm their educational judgment that racial literacy is a
particularly important objective for a secondary school in a de-
mocratic community.7 Thus no one could credibly deny that a
public secondary school district has a compelling educational in-
terest in teaching its students racial literacy.'
4. John Dewey, Education in Democracy, reprinted in STEVEN M. CAHN, CLASSIC AND
CONTEMPORARY READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 288-93 (Philip A. Butcher
ed., 1997).
5. See, e.g., BRUCE M. MITCHELL & ROBERT E. SALSBURY, MULTICULTURAL EDUCA-
TION IN THE U.S.: A GUIDE TO POLICIES AND PROGRAMS IN THE 50 STATES passim (2000)
(listing states that have racial literacy programs, persons overseeing such programs, fund-
ing for programs, or other similar equity programs: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). Numer-
ous other states, although lacking a specific program, stress multi-racial learning within
the classrooms through efforts such as teacher education and local decision making. See
NEIL POSTMAN, THE END OF EDUCATION: REDEFINING THE VALUE OF SCHOOL (1995).
6. See MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, EDUCATION LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE: CASES AND
MATERIALS 400-04 (2005); see also supra note 5.
7. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162,
1175 (9th Cir. 2005); McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 849
(W.D. Ky. 2004), affld, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005).
8. Not even amici supporting objectors to race-conscious school assignment in the
Supreme Court can credibly question the compelling interest in teaching racial literacy. In
their advocacy piece filed in the Supreme Court, David Armor, Abigail Thernstrom, and
Stephan Thernstrom attempt to challenge selected empirical studies demonstrating the
connection between a racially diverse school environment and achievement gains. See
Brief for David Armar, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 9-29 Parents In-
volved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, Nos. 05-908 & 05-915 (U.S. Aug. 21,
2006). They do not, and cannot, challenge the judgment of educators and state policymak-
ers that racial literacy acquisition is a compelling interest. Rather, they only question a
few of the numerous studies showing the connection between racially diverse schools and
achievement. Nor do these amici provide a single example of any serious empirical study
disproving what educational professionals and experts understand from their actual ex-
perience: racially diverse educational environments are related to learning outcomes. Fi-
nally, these amici, who were engaged by objectors to Seattle's plan in that litigation, do
not question the results of precise studies showing a connection between a diverse educa-
[Vol. 42:707
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Once it is conceded that teaching racial literacy is a compelling
interest, the only remaining question for equal protection analy-
sis is whether a district's educational strategies and instructional
practices sufficiently serve that interest. Where race is at issue,
those strategies and practices must be narrowly tailored to
achieve the compelling interest of teaching racial literacy. There
are many approaches to teaching generally, and to teaching racial
literacy in particular. Based on a wealth of empirical evidence
and experience, however, many educational professionals have
determined that an effective method of teaching racial literacy
requires students to interact with peers from a different racial
background.' Secondary school educational professionals under-
tional environment and racial literacy acquisition.
9. A vast amount of social science research has been generated indicating the educa-
tional benefits of a racially diverse educational environment generally, and the benefits of
such an environment to the production of racial literacy. See, e.g., James A. Banks, Intro-
duction: Democratic Citizenship Education in Multicultural Societies, in DIVERSITY AND
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 10 (James A. Banks ed. 2004) (arguing that proper education can
prepare students better for democratic citizenship); Geneva Gay, Curriculum Theory and
Multicultural Education, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 32-
35 (James A. Banks ed., 2d ed. 2004) (reviewing scholarship on the value of multicultural
education and defining multicultural education as an idea that recognizes the importance
of ethnic and cultural diversity in educational settings); Amy Guttmann, Unity and Diver-
sity in Democratic Multicultural Education, in DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION,
supra, at 71 (presenting that multicultural education furthers democratic ideals through
teaching tolerance and role that cultural differences have had in the shaping of society);
THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON
THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Gary Orfield ed., 2001); Thomas F. Pettigrew, Inter-
group Contact: Theory, Research, and New Perspectives, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 770 (James A. Banks ed., 2d ed. 2004) (arguing that proper
education prepares students better for democratic citizenship); Janet Ward Schofield, Fos-
tering Positive Intergroup Relations in Schools, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTI-
CULTURAL EDUCATION 799 (James A. Banks ed., 2d ed. 2004) (agreeing that multicultural
education can improve ethnic relations among students, primarily because young students
have their first experiences with others from different ethnic backgrounds in schools, and
outlining policies to effectively foster those relationships); Robert Slavin, Cooperative
Learning and Intergroup Relations, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL
EDUCATION 633 (James A. Banks ed. 1995) (offering an overview of intergroup research
studies and concluding that students in ethnically diverse education settings receive long-
lasting social, cross-ethnic friendships and improved student achievement); Walter G.
Stephan & Cookie White Stephan, Intergroup Relations in Multicultural Education Pro-
grams, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 782 (James A. Banks
ed., 2d ed. 2004) (affirming that one goal of multicultural education is to improve relations
among ethnic groups and reviewing the processes that lead to such change); AMY STUART
WELLS ET AL., How DESEGREGATION CHANGED US: THE EFFECTS OF RACIALLY MIXED
SCHOOLS ON STUDENTS AND SOCIETY, drawn from IN SEARCH OF BROWN (forthcoming
2005) (reporting positive overall societal results from integration of schools by studying a
particular class from 1980, including students who are less racially prejudiced and more
open to people of different backgrounds); Patricia Gurin et al., The Benefits of Diversity in
Education for Democratic Citizenship, 60 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 17, 32 (2004) (presenting stud-
ies that examine and conclude that diversity in student bodies, although altered by per-
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stand that racial literacy cannot be taught through the monolithic
sonal experiences with the diverse groups, generally create students that are better suited
for "democratic citizenship"); Robert E. Slavin & Eileen Oickle, Effects of Cooperative
Learning Teams on Student Achievement and Race Relations: Treatment by Race Interac-
tions, 54 SOC. OF EDUC. 174, 178 (1981) (finding that both white and African-American
students gained academically from cooperative diverse learning environments); Derek
Black, Comment, The Case for the New Compelling Government Interest: Improving Edu-
cational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. REV. 923, 944-47 (2002) (noting the vast amount of research
affirming the positive effects of diverse educational environments).
A host of literature has begun to emerge on the value of multicultural education in the
international forum as well. See, e.g., Stephen Castles, Migration, Citizenship, and Educa-
tion, in DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION, supra at 32-42 (reviewing different
strategies immigrant countries have implemented to further multicultural ideals in educa-
tion); Peter Figueroa, Diversity and Citizenship Education in England, in DIVERSITY AND
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION, supra at 236 (noting the new curriculum in England to further
citizenship education through a multicultural approach).
Several social science studies have generally studied the educational benefits of racially
diverse schools. See, e.g., Jomills Henry Braddock II & Tamela McNulty Eitle, The Effects
of School Desegregation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 828
(James A. Banks ed., 2d ed. 2004) (providing an overview of the social science research re-
garding the effects of desegregation and concluding that modest, but significant, improve-
ments exist for African-American students); Janet Ward Schofield, Review of Research on
School Desegregation's Impact on Elementary and Secondary School Students, in
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 597 (James A. Banks ed., 1995)
(providing a comprehensive survey of the major social and statistical studies on desegrega-
tion and the impact on African-American students, Hispanic students, and white students
from 1975 through 1991 and concluding that the positive effects of desegregation include,
inter alia, improved reading skills for young African Americans and higher college gradua-
tion rates leading to higher employment income); Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects
on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 753 (1998) (providing
an overview of the social science literature regarding diversity and desegregation, the re-
sulting impact on students, and finding that the reliable findings are typically positive);
Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, The Academic Consequences of Desegregation and Segregation:
Evidence from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1513, 1560 (2003) (con-
cluding that all students benefit from diverse schools, African-American identified schools
have negative effects on all students, and even desegregated schools may have dispropor-
tionate education based on race due to other social and academic factors); Amy Stuart
Wells & Robert L. Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects of School Deseg-
regation, 64 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 531, 532, 540, 546, 552 (1994) (reviewing twenty-one stud-
ies of the impacts of desegregation and integrated learning environments, concluding that
African-American students attending desegregated schools set future employment goals
higher than in segregated schools, a higher ratio of African-American students from de-
segregated schools attain higher education, and African-American students from desegre-
gated schools are more likely to be employed in white-collar/professional careers); Eric A.
Hanushek et al., New Evidence about Brown v. Board of Education: The Complex Effects of
School Racial Composition on Achievement 23-24 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 8741, 2002) (studying academic achievement and concluding that African
American achievement, particularly in mathematics, is improved through diverse learn-
ing); THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE IMPACT OF RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DIVERSITY ON EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES: CAMBRIDGE, MA SCHOOL DISTRICT (Jan.
2002), http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/diversity/cambridge-diversity.
pdf, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE IMPACT OF RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DIVERSITY ON EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES: LYNN, MA SCHOOL DISTRICT (Feb. 2002),
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/diversity[Lynn Report.pdf.
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delivery of information to passive students.'" Rather, teaching ra-
cial literacy requires prompting students to confront the personal
and political nature of race and racism in their educational envi-
ronment." From an educational perspective, the use of student
assignment to maintain meaningful numbers of racially diverse
students in a secondary school is precisely tailored to achieve the
compelling interest in teaching racial literacy. A school district's
use of student assignment to create a meaningful number of di-
verse students in a school in order to serve its compelling interest
in teaching racial literacy, therefore, should survive any credible
constitutional challenge.
Still, there are serious challenges to the constitutionality of
such educational strategies. The challenges necessarily question
whether a public school district's interest in teaching its students
racial literacy is indeed compelling, or the connection between
that interest and the strategy of maintaining meaningful num-
bers of diverse students in a school, or both. As this article shows,
any judicial determination that the interest in teaching racial lit-
eracy in secondary schools is not compelling would be contrary to
the educational judgment of countless experts, teachers, school
administrators, local school boards, and state boards of education.
The judicial determination that the strategy of assigning mean-
ingful numbers of diverse students in a school is not narrowly tai-
lored to serve that interest also would be contrary to the judg-
ment of professional educators.
In addition, requiring school districts to produce meaningful
numbers of racially diverse students in a particular school within
an otherwise racially segregated district by race-neutral assign-
ment strategies cannot be narrowly tailored to the interest in
producing such numbers. Race-neutral school assignment plans
in a segregated district cannot produce meaningful numbers of
diverse students unless their race-neutral criteria are either a de-
liberate proxy for race, or their race-neutral criteria happen for-
10. See supra note 9; see also Jane Bolgatz, Developing Racial Literacy: What Happens
When Students and Teachers Talk About Race (2004), http://2004.diversityconference.com/
ProposalSystem/Presentations/P000465.
11. Id.; see also Brief for American Council on Education and Twenty Other Higher
Education Organizations as Amici Curiae supporting Respondents at 8, Parents Involved
in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, Nos. 05-908 & 05-915 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2006) (cit-
ing Jean Piaget, Piaget's Theory, in 1 CARMICHAEL'S MANUAL OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 703
(Paul H. Mussen ed., 3d ed. 1997)).
2007]
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tuitously to coincide with race. If a school district's effort to as-
sign students based on race is infirm, its deliberate effort to as-
sign students based on a reliable proxy for race would be equally
infirm. Moreover, if the district's assignment plan produces racial
diversity by happenstance, that plan cannot be designed to serve
the compelling interest in teaching racial literacy. Accordingly,
this article concludes that a principled application of the Supreme
Court's equal protection standards would reveal that a school dis-
trict's race-conscious use of student assignment is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the compelling interest in teaching racial liter-
acy.
Yet, it is extraordinary that the constitutionality of such educa-
tional strategies would hinge on the Supreme Court's uneducated
judgment about whether the educational benefits of racial liter-
acy are compelling and whether the use of student assignment
may achieve those benefits. In Section III, therefore, this article
proceeds to demonstrate that the Court's current template for
analyzing race-conscious decisions by public school officials
should be modified. That template is the product of judicial
precedent detached from any authentic understanding of the
principle of equality undergirding the Equal Protection Clause.
An analysis tethered to an authentic principle of equality would
begin by scrutinizing whether the state educational administra-
tors are reasonable in their assessment of the practical educa-
tional differences in persons that justify differential educational
treatment. Where students affected by such governmental educa-
tional programs are not in fact similarly situated, programs that
treat them differently should not be presumed to be unconstitu-
tional. Where teaching racial literacy depends on understanding
the existence of at least some racial differences, a program that is
conscious of those differences in meeting its goal of teaching
about them cannot be inconsistent with an authentic understand-
ing of equality.
[Vol. 42:707
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EDUCATIONAL STRATEGIES BY
PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS DESIGNED TO TEACH RACIAL LITERACY
UNDER CURRENT STANDARDS
A. The Supreme Court Strictly Scrutinizes All Race-Conscious
Decisions by Public School Districts
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." 2 The Amendment's prohibition extends to "any per-
son" within the state.13 Where federal or state governments clas-
sify a person according to race, the Supreme Court reviews such
governmental action under the most "detailed judicial inquiry."14
The Court recently has made clear that "[aill racial classifications
reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly
scrutinized."" Strict scrutiny applies regardless of whether the
racial classifications are invidious or benign and "is not depend-
ent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification." 6 The Court requires such a demanding inquiry "to
'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legisla-
tive body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a
highly suspect tool." 7 Accordingly, all racial classifications by the
government, regardless of purported motivation, are "inherently
suspect,"" and "presumptively invalid." 9
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. Id.
14. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2002) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)); see Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) ("At the
heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the
Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, reli-
gious, sexual or national class.") (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602
(1990)) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
15. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (emphasis added).
16. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Cro-
son Co., 488 U.S. 464, 494 (1989)) (plurality opinion) (internal quotations omitted); see
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2004) ("We have insisted on strict scrutiny in
every context, even for so-called 'benign' racial classifications, such as race-conscious uni-
versity admissions policies, race-based preferences in government contracts, and race-
based districting intended to improve minority representation.") (internal citations omit-
ted).
17. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226 (quoting J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493); see also
Miller, 515 U.S. at 904 (finding that the Equal Protection Clause's "central mandate is ra-
cial neutrality in governmental decisionmaking").
18. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 (1980)
20071
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Under "strict scrutiny," race-conscious actions are permissible
only where the government carries the burden of proving that
these actions are "narrowly tailored to further compelling gov-
ernmental interests."2' The strict scrutiny standard is not "strict
in theory, but fatal in fact." 21 Although all governmental uses of
race now are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by
that scrutiny.22 In applying strict scrutiny, however, the Court
also has recognized that "[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-
based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause."23
B. The State Has a Compelling Interest in Having its Secondary
Schools Teach Racial Literacy
Under strict scrutiny, a government action will not survive
unless it is animated by a "compelling state interest."24 Because
strict scrutiny requires the Court to evaluate the "fit" between the
government's means and its ends, 25 it is critical to identify pre-
(Stewart, J., dissenting)).
19. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643-44 (1993) (quoting Pers. Admin. of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
20. See also Johnson 543 U.S. at 505, 512; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226-27. The Su-
preme Court, in Johnson, rejected the argument that a California Department of Correc-
tions ("CDC") policy in which all inmates were segregated by race should be subjected to
relaxed scrutiny because the policy "neither benefits nor burdens one group or individual
more than any other group or individual." 543 U.S. at 506. The Court also recognized that
all racial classifications "raise special fears that they are motivated by an invidious pur-
pose" and that "'[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-
based measures, there is simply no way of determining... what classifications are in fact
motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.'" Id. at 505-
06 (omission in original). Johnson is not entirely analogous to the voluntary integration
strategies because the CDC segregated inmates on the basis of race, whereas the District's
use of race is aimed at achieving the opposite result-attaining and maintaining inte-
grated schools. Nevertheless, the First, Sixth and Ninth Circuits-the only circuits to rule,
post-Grutter and Gratz, on the constitutionality of a voluntary plan designed to achieve
the benefits of racial diversity in the public secondary school setting-all have concluded
that the Plan must be reviewed under strict scrutiny. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm.,
418 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc); McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 330 F.
Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004), affd, 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
21. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (quoting Fullilove, 515 U.S. at 519) (internal quotations
omitted).
22. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-27.
23. Id. at 327.
24. See id. at 325, 327.
25. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (plurality opin-
[Vol. 42:707
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cisely the governmental interests to which the government's use
of race must fit. 26
The Supreme Court thus far has endorsed two compelling gov-
ernmental interests that have justified race-conscious decision
making in the public education context. First, the Court has al-
lowed racial classifications to remedy past racial imbalances in
schools resulting from past de jure segregation, or proven acts of
de facto segregation. 27 This interest, however, cannot by itself jus-
tify racial classifications where a public school district engages in
voluntary race-conscious decision making.2" Second, the Court
has allowed undergraduate and graduate universities to consider
race in deciding whether to admit a student in order to achieve
the compelling governmental interest in producing the educa-
tional benefits of student body diversity.29 The Court thus far has
struck down every other interest claimed to be compelling enough
to justify race-conscious decision making.3" Moreover, the Court
has declared that racial balance is not by itself a compelling in-
terest justifying racial classifications and that "outright racial
balancing... is patently unconstitutional."3
1. The Supreme Court Has Recognized that the State Has a
Compelling Interest in Teaching Racial Literacy
In Grutter, the Supreme Court recognized that the promotion of
specific educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
population is a compelling governmental interest. 32 The Court
26. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (plurality opinion) (stating
that, in order to determine whether an order was narrowly tailored, the court "must exam-
ine the purposes the order was intended to serve").
27. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,494 (1992).
28. See id.
29. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 224, 268-69 (2003).
30. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-12 (1996) (rejecting racial classifica-
tions to "alleviate the effects of societal discrimination"); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (rejecting racial classifications in the awarding of public con-
struction contracts in the absence of findings of past discrimination); Wygant, 476 U.S. at
274-76 (1986) (rejecting racial classifications in a school district's teacher layoff policy
when offered as a means of providing minority role models for its minority students and as
a means of alleviating past societal discrimination); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 310-11 (Powell, J., concurring) (rejecting the application of race-conscious
measures to improve "the delivery of health-care services to communities currently under-
served").
31. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330; see also Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494 ("Racial balance is not
to be achieved for it own sake.").
32. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (stating the law school's concept of critical mass is
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identified no less than thirteen "substantial" governmental bene-
fits that flow from a diverse student population: (1) overarching
educational benefits; (2) an increase in the "robust" exchange of
ideas; (3) cross-racial understanding; (4) breaking down racial
stereotypes; (5) livelier, more spirited, enlightening and interest-
ing classroom discussions; (6) the promotion of learning "out-
comes"; (7) better preparation of students to work and interact in
an "increasingly diverse" society and workforce; (8) better prepa-
ration as professionals in an "increasingly global marketplace";
(9) helping the military to fulfill its very mission of "national se-
curity"; (10) facilitating the "diffusion of knowledge and opportu-
nity through public institutions of higher education" to be acces-
sible to all individuals and thereby sustaining our "political and
cultural heritage"; (11) fostering the effective participation by
members of all racial and ethnic groups which is vital to becom-
ing one nation; (12) supporting the training in law school for di-
verse national leaders and thereby cultivating leaders with le-
gitimacy; and (13) developing attorneys of diverse races and
ethnicities who will be able, in turn, to help all members of a "het-
erogeneous society" succeed.33
These substantial benefits include racial literacy in the form of
cross-racial understanding, breaking down racial stereotypes,
learning outcomes about race, preparation to operate in a "di-
verse" society, and the "diffusion of knowledge" about racial di-
versity.34 In evaluating the relevance of diversity to educational
objectives, the Court focused principally on the "learning out-
comes" that a diverse student body provides.35 Those learning
outcomes are derived not only from having diverse viewpoints
represented in the "robust exchange of ideas,"36 but also from the
presence of diverse students in the classroom as a method of chal-
lenging racial stereotypes.37 The Court deferred to the law
school's educational judgment not only in determining that diver-
"defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce").
33. Id. at 329-33 (internal quotations omitted).
34. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31.
35. Id. at 330.
36. Id. at 329-30 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978))
(internal quotations omitted).
37. Id. at 330, 333.
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sity would produce these benefits, but also in determining that
these benefits were critical to the school's educational mission.3
2. The Educational Benefits of Teaching Racial Literacy to
Secondary School Students are Particularly Compelling
In attempting to fit within the compelling interest identified in
Grutter and Gratz, public school districts have identified specific
educational benefits produced by a diverse secondary school popu-
lation. These benefits include the acquisition of racial literacy.
For example, in the Seattle District,
[t]hese interests are articulated in the "Board Statement Reaffirm-
ing Diversity Rationale" as:
Diversity in the classroom increases the likelihood that stu-
dents will discuss racial or ethnic issues and be more likely to
socialize with people of different races. Diversity is thus a
valuable resource for teaching students to become citizens in a
multi-racial/multi-ethnic world.
Providing students the opportunity to attend schools with di-
verse student enrollment also has inherent educational value
from the standpoint of education's role in a democratic society.
• . . Diversity brings different viewpoints and experiences to
classroom discussions and thereby enhances the educational
process. It also fosters racial and cultural understanding,
which is particularly important in a racially and culturally di-
verse society such as ours ....
The District ... believes that providing a diverse learning en-
vironment is educationally beneficial for all students.
39
Similarly, the Jefferson County School's objective is "to give all
students the benefits of an education in a racially integrated
38. See id. at 328-33. The Court also relied upon the expertise and evidence submit-
ted by amici curiae-including educators, business leaders and the military-that the
educational benefits that flow from diversity constitute a compelling interest. Id. at 330-
31 ("The Law School's claim of a compelling interest is further bolstered by its amici, who
point to the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity.") ("These benefits
are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses have made clear that the skills
needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure
to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.") ("[Hligh-ranking retired officers
and civilian leaders of the United States military assert that, '[b]ased on [their] decades of
experience,' a 'highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the mili-
tary's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security.'") (omissions and
alterations in original).
39. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1174
(9th Cir. 2006).
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school,"40 including "a better academic education for all students"
and "better appreciation of our political and cultural heritage for
all students."41
As the Supreme Court's strong line of public school decisions
recognizes, these interests in the educational benefits of a diverse
secondary school student population are as compelling as those
identified in Grutter. The Supreme Court in Grutter noted the
importance of higher education in "preparing students for work
and citizenship."42 Public secondary schools have an even more
significant role in this preparation. As the Supreme Court ex-
plained in Plyler v. Doe, "We have recognized 'the public schools
as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democ-
ratic system of government,' and as the primary vehicle for
transmitting the 'values on which our society rests.' 43 The Court
further recognized that public education perpetuates the political
system and the economic and social advancement of citizens and
that "education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric
of our society."' In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,45 as
well, the Court declared that the inculcation of civic values is
"truly the work of the schools."4" In Ambach v. Norwick,47 the
Court likewise observed that public schools transmit to children
"the values on which our society rests," 4 including "fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political sys-
tem."49 In Brown v. Board of Education,5" of course, the Court de-
clared:
[Education] is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities .... It is the very foundation of good citi-
zenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
40. Id.
41. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (W.D. Ky.
2004), affd, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005).
42. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331.
43. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Shempp,
374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) and Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,
76 (1979)) (internal citation omitted).
44. Id.
45. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
46. Id. at 683 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
508 (1969)) (internal quotations omitted).
47. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
48. Id. at 76-77.
49. Id. at 77.
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his envi-
ronment. 51
Moreover, for the significant number of public high school
graduates who do not attend college, 52 the public high school edu-
cational experience will be their sole opportunity to reap the
benefits of a diverse learning environment. As the district court
found in McFarland, the "benefits of racial tolerance and under-
standing are equally as 'important and laudable' in public ele-
mentary and secondary education as in higher education."53
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court itself relied upon elemen-
tary and secondary school cases to reach its judgment in Grutter
that the benefits of racial diversity in an educational institution
are compelling. In these cases, the Supreme Court specifically
proclaimed that "'the public schools [are] a most vital civic insti-
tution for the preservation of a democratic system of government'
and.., the primary vehicle for transmitting the 'values on which
our society rests."'5 4 Moreover, the Court concluded in the context
51. Id. at 493; see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (discussing the "sub-
stantial" benefits that flow from a racially diverse student body and citing sources that
detail the impact of racial diversity in the educational environment). The Supreme Court
in Grutter endorsed a law school's compelling interest in diversity in the broader sense of
diverse viewpoints. Id. at 329-30. In serving that broader goal of diversity, a law school
may consider race along with other attributes such as socioeconomic status, ability to
speak multiple languages or extracurricular talents. Id. at 338. The Ninth Circuit inter-
preted Grutter, however, to recognize that "racial diversity, not some proxy for it, is valu-
able in and of itself." Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d
1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006). Public school districts also asserted a corollary, compelling in-
terest in avoiding the educational disadvantages of racially concentrated or isolated
schools. In particular, according to the Ninth Circuit, the Seattle District's program was
designed to spread the educational benefits of a diverse learning environment to all its
students and to ensure that "no student should be required to attend a racially concen-
trated school." Id. The Court also recognized that "research regarding desegregation has
found that racially concentrated or isolated schools are characterized by much higher lev-
els of poverty, lower average test scores, lower levels of student achievement, with less-
qualified teachers and fewer advanced courses-'[w]ith few exceptions, separate schools
are still unequal schools.'" Id.
52. "According to the Seattle Times' School Guide submitted by Parents, for the year
2000, on average 34% of Seattle's high school graduates attend four-year colleges after
graduation and 38.2% attend two-year colleges, although percentages vary from high
school to high school." Id. at 1176 n.16.
53. The First Circuit also concluded that there is significant evidence supporting the
view that the benefits to be derived from a racially diverse educational milieu "are more
compelling at younger ages." Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir.
2005) (emphasis added); McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834,
853 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330), affd, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005).
54. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) and Ambach v. Ivorwick, 441 U.S. 68,
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of public secondary schools that the "[p]rocess of educating our
youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the
curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example
the shared values of a civilized social order."55 The Court also has
recognized that the educational benefits of a racially diverse
school extend to all students in that school: "Attending an ethni-
cally diverse school may help . . . [in] preparing minority children
'for citizenship in our pluralistic society' while, we may hope,
teaching members of the racial majority 'to live in harmony and
mutual respect' with children of minority heritage."56
76 (1979)) (internal citations omitted).
55. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). With respect to the
educational advantages of a racially diverse secondary school, Judge Kozinski in his con-
currence in Seattle recognized:
It is difficult to deny the importance of teaching children, during their for-
mative years, how to deal respectfully and collegially with peers of different
races. Whether one would call this a compelling interest or merely a highly
rational one strikes me as little more than semantics. The reality is that atti-
tudes and patterns of interaction are developed early in life and, in a multi-
cultural and diverse society such as ours, there is great value in developing
the ability to interact successfully with individuals who are very different
from oneself. It is important for the individual student, to be sure, but it is
also vitally important for us as a society.
It may be true, as the dissent suggests, that students are influenced far
more by their experiences in the home, church and social clubs they attend
outside of school. But this does not negate the fact that time spent in school
and on school-related activities, which may take up as much as half of a stu-
dent's waking hours, nevertheless has a significant impact on that student's
development. The school environment forces students both to compete and
cooperate in the classroom, as well as during extracurricular activities rang-
ing from football to forensics. Schoolmates often become friends, rivals and
romantic partners; learning to deal with individuals of different races in
these various capacities cannot help but foster the live-and-let-live spirit that
is the essence of the American experience. I believe this is a rational objective
for an educational system-every bit as rational as teaching the three Rs, ad-
vanced chemistry or driver's education. Schools, after all, don't simply pre-
pare students for further education, though they certainly can and should do
that; good schools prepare students for life, by instilling skills and attitudes
that will serve them long after their first year of college.
Seattle, 426 F.3d at 1194-95 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
56. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 473 (1982) (quoting Estes v.
Metro. Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 451 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) and
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 485 n.5 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)) (in-
ternal citation omitted).
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3. The Professional Educational Judgment that Teaching Racial
Literacy is a Compelling School District Objective Should
Survive Judicial Scrutiny
The Supreme Court also has recognized that the federal courts
are ill-equipped to second-guess the educational judgment of local
school officials. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
that "[nIo single tradition in public education is more deeply
rooted than local control over the operation of schools." 7 Because
"the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibil-
ity of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and
not of federal judges,""8 courts have long deferred to the profes-
sional judgment of local school districts regarding matters of edu-
cational policy. The Supreme Court, for example, concluded:
[E]ducational policy [is an] area in which this Court's lack of special-
ized knowledge and experience counsels against premature interfer-
ence with the informed judgments made at the state and local levels
.... [Tihe judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing on the
States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or
handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to
finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping
abreast of ever-changing conditions. 
59
Local control serves important interests, particularly in the
context of education. According to the Supreme Court, "local con-
trol over the educational process affords citizens an opportunity
to participate in decision making, permits the structuring of
school programs to fit local needs, and encourages 'experimenta-
tion, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excel-
lence."'60
Certainly the interest in local control cannot justify conduct by
a local arm of government that is unconstitutional. But where a
local school district's goal of enhancing educational opportunities
for all of its students is clearly constitutional, the methods by
which it seeks to accomplish that goal are entitled to deference.
Therefore, the Supreme Court has concluded that a school dis-
57. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974); see also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977) ("[Olur cases have . . .firmly recognized that local
autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition.").
58. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
59. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973).
60. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 742 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50).
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trict's judgment that the use of race in considering which of its
schools a student should be assigned to is entitled to particular
deference. According to the Court, school districts "are tradition-
ally charged with broad power to formulate and implement edu-
cational policy, and might well conclude ... that in order to pre-
pare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should
have a prescribed ration of [African-American] to white students
reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole."61
C. The Educational Strategy of Assigning Meaningful Numbers of
Diverse Students to a Particular Educational Environment is
Narrowly Tailored to Achieve the Compelling Interest in
Teaching Racial Literacy
The public school districts' use of race-conscious decision mak-
ing must be narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling interests
in the educational benefits of a diverse student population. 62 The
attempt by public school districts to demonstrate that their use of
race in student assignment is narrowly tailored to achieve their
compelling interests is typically framed by the Court's narrow tai-
loring analysis in Grutter and Gratz.63
In Gratz, the Court held unconstitutional the University of
Michigan's undergraduate admissions program, which automati-
cally assigned twenty points on the admissions scale to an appli-
cant from an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group.64
In Grutter, by contrast, the Court upheld the University of Michi-
gan Law School's admissions policy, which took race into account
as one of several variables in an individual's application.65 The
law school's policy also attempted to ensure that a "critical mass"
61. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); see also Deal
v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 61 (6th Cir. 1966) ("[I]t is not unconstitutional for
[boards of education] to consider racial factors and take steps to relieve racial imbalance if
in their sound judgment such action is the best method of avoiding educational harm.").
Rather, "[a]n integrated school experience is too important to the nation's children for this
Court to jeopardize the opportunity for such an experience by constructing obstacles that
would discourage school officials from voluntarily undertaking creative programs." Hig-
gins v. Bd. of Educ. of Grand Rapids, 508 F.2d 779, 795 (6th Cir. 1974).
62. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
63. See id. at 333-34 (noting that the narrow tailoring "inquiry must be calibrated to
fit the distinct issues raised" in a given case, taking "'relevant differences into account'"
(quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995)).
64. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255, 272 (2003).
65. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315-16, 340, 343.
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of underrepresented minority students would be admitted in or-
der to realize the benefits of a diverse student body.66
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit articulated the Supreme
Court's identified hallmarks of a narrowly tailored race-conscious
admissions plan as "(1) the absence of quotas; (2) individualized
consideration of applicants; (3) serious, good-faith consideration
of race-neutral alternatives to the program; (4) that no member of
any racial group was unduly harmed; and (5) that the program
had a sunset provision or some other end point."67
1. Individualized Consideration
The first narrow-tailoring factor of individualized consideration
appears to be inapplicable in the context of race-conscious deci-
sion making by non-competitive public secondary schools. Public
school districts do not engage in an individualized consideration
of each applicant's characteristics and qualifications.6" Indeed,
the Seattle District conceded its lack of individual assessment by
claiming that its interest in encouraging diverse schools required
that its "tiebreaker must necessarily focus on the race of its stu-
dents."69 The issue is whether the constitutionality of a public
secondary school's race-conscious educational strategies should
depend on whether those strategies are part of an individualized
assessment of each student.
On the one hand, individualized consideration protects the in-
dividual from group classifications, especially those by race.7" The
"Fourteenth Amendment 'protect[s] persons, not groups."'71 Grut-
ter emphasized the importance of the individualized consideration
of each applicant, declaring that in the context of a race-conscious
university admissions program, such consideration
66. See id. at 316. The Court explained that "critical mass" was defined by the law
school as "meaningful numbers" or "meaningful representation," or "a number that en-
courages underrepresented minority students to participate in the classroom and not feel
isolated." See id. at 318.
67. See Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Grutter,
539 U.S. at 333-43; Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2005) (charac-
terizing Grutter as outlining a "four-part narrow tailoring inquiry").
68. Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
69. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1183
(9th Cir. 2005).
70. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
71. Id. (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227).
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must remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evalu-
ated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's
race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application. The
importance of this individualized consideration in the context of a
race-conscious admissions program is paramount. 
72
Individualized consideration of an applicant, however, does not
require an educational program to be indifferent to race. The pro-
gram may consider race, but in doing so, it must remain 'flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of
the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them
on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily
according them the same weight.' 73 There can be "no policy, ei-
ther de jure or de facto, of automatic acceptance or rejection based
on any single 'soft' variable ... [such as the awarding of] me-
chanical, predetermined diversity 'bonuses' based on race or eth-
nicity."74 The public school districts who consider race in assign-
ing students do so as part of a multi-factoral analysis. Yet, there
is no question that some students have been and will be assigned
to some schools, or classrooms, because their presence in the
school or in the classroom helps provide meaningful numbers of
racially diverse students.
Rather than address the school districts' lack of individualized
assessment, proponents of race-conscious student assignment
plans, and the courts that have accepted them, therefore, have
simply concluded that "if a noncompetitive, voluntary student as-
signment plan is otherwise narrowly tailored, a district need not
consider each student in a individualized, holistic manner."75 A
school district need not consider each student in a holistic matter,
they argue, because students do not compete for admission to
seats in a school district.76 In the context of university admis-
sions, where applicants compete for a limited number of spaces in
a class, the Court in Grutter and Gratz focused its inquiry on the
role race may play in judging an applicant's qualifications. The
Court's underlying concern was that the "admissions policy 'is
flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in
72. Id. at 337 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 334 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317
(1978)).
74. Id. at 337.
75. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d
1162, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005).
76. See id. at 1184.
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light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to
place them on the same footing for consideration .... ,,,7' The fo-
cus on fair competition was driven by the desire to avoid the
stigma that may attach if some individuals are viewed as unable
to achieve success without special protection. 78 In order to pre-
vent race from being used as a mechanical proxy for an appli-
cant's qualifications, the Supreme Court required individualized
consideration of each applicant across a broad range of factors, of
which race may be but one.79
This focus on an applicant's qualifications, including an appli-
cant's test scores, grades, artistic or athletic ability, musical tal-
ent or life experience, however, is arguably not applicable where
there is no competition or consideration of qualifications at issue.
All high school students must and will be placed in a public
school.8 0 In Seattle, for instance, no assignment to any of the Dis-
trict's high schools is linked to a student's "qualifications.""
"Thus, no stigma results from any particular school assign-
ment." 2 "Accordingly, the danger that may be present in the uni-
77. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317) (Powell, J., concurring);
see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995) ("The injury in cases of
this kind is that a 'discriminatory classification prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on
an equal footing.'" (quoting Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656,
667 (1993)).
78. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("Classifications
based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for re-
medial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics
of racial hostility."); see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[P]referential pro-
grams may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to
achieve success without special protection based on a factor having no relationship to indi-
vidual worth.").
79. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-37; see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 272 (2003) (hold-
ing that the undergraduate admissions policy was not narrowly tailored because the "auto-
matic distribution of 20 points has the effect of making 'the factor of race . . . decisive' for
virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant") (quoting Bakke,
438 U.S. at 317) (emphasis added).
80. Children have no right or entitlement to attend a particular school. See Bustop
Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Los Angeles, 439 U.S. 1380, 1383 (1978) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice)
(denying stay and rejecting any legally protected right to have children attend their near-
est school).
81. Seattle, 426 F.3d at 1181. Students' relative qualifications are irrelevant because
regardless of their academic achievement, sports or artistic ability, musical talent, or life
experience, any student who wants to attend Seattle's public high schools is entitled to an
assignment.
82. Id. In Bakke, Justice Powell noted:
Respondent's position is wholly dissimilar to that of a pupil bused from his
neighborhood school to a comparable school in another neighborhood in com-
pliance with a desegregation decree. Petitioner did not arrange for respon-
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versity context of-substituting racial preference for qualifica-
tion-based competition [is]-absent"s3 when a public school dis-
trict assigns students to one of its many schools. 4
Yet, race-conscious student assignment still appears to be ob-
jectionable under Gratz as a mechanical, predetermined policy "of
automatic acceptance or rejection" based on a student's race.15
First, objectors argue that any classification of students as
"white" or "nonwhite" runs counter to the required individualized
consideration of each applicant.8 6 Second, opponents argue that,
although public school districts do not exclude any student from a
public education by operation of race-conscious decisions, and
there is no competition for admission to any of the district's
schools, there is a competltive market for school attendance
zones. 7 Third, opponents argue that individualized assessment
by public school districts would not be impractical.8 "
Nonetheless, these arguments in favor of the possibility of in-
dividualized assessment are misplaced. A public school district's
lack of individualized assessment cannot render its plan uncon-
stitutional where its precise compelling interests are not served
by any such individualized assessment of irrelevant characteris-
tics. The Supreme Court's requirement of individualized, holistic
review in Grutter may be tailored to the compelling interest ad-
dent to attend a different medical school in order to desegregate Davis Medi-
cal School; instead, it denied him admission and may have deprived him alto-
gether of a medical education.
438 U.S. at 300 n.39.
83. Seattle, 426 F.3d at 1181.
84. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) ("Because trans-
fers under the Lynn Plan are not tied to merit, the Plan's use of race does not risk impos-
ing stigmatic harm by fueling the stereotype that 'certain groups are unable to achieve
success without special protection.'") (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298).
85. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
16-24, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-915 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2006) (quoting
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338).
86. See id. at 20.
87. See id. at 22-23.
88. Id. at 22. In the 2000-2001 school year, approximately 3,000 students entered the
Seattle District's high schools.
Ten percent of those students were subject to the racial tiebreaker. Thus, un-
der an individualized approach, the District would have had to examine only
three hundred applications to determine who to admit to the oversubscribed
schools. Instead, the District grouped those three hundred students into
white and nonwhite categories and allowed a computer to select their as-
signment based solely upon their race.
Seattle, 426 F.3d at 1212 (Bea, J., dissenting).
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vanced by the law school in fostering viewpoint diversity, but it is
not tailored to a public secondary school's compelling interest in
producing the educational benefits of racial literacy. 9 The Su-
preme Court noted that the law school did not "limit in any way
the broad range of qualities and experiences that may be consid-
ered valuable contributions to student body diversity."9" To this
end, the law school's policy made clear that "[t]here are many
possible bases for diversity admissions, and provide[d] examples
of admittees who have lived or traveled widely abroad, are fluent
in several languages, have overcome personal adversity and fam-
ily hardship, have exceptional records of extensive community
service, and had successful careers in other fields."9' These mul-
tiple bases for diversity ensure the "classroom discussion is live-
lier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting
when the students have the greatest possible variety of back-
grounds."92
In the high school context, as well, the educational benefits of
class interactions are enhanced by viewpoint diversity. As the
Supreme Court recognized in Tinker, "The [high school] classroom
is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas. The Nation's future de-
pends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of
tongues .... ""
Whereas individualized assessment may be finely tailored to
achieve the educational benefits of viewpoint diversity, however,
such assessment is not at all tailored to achieve a public school
district's distinct compelling interest in teaching racial literacy.
The objective of teaching racial literacy is not necessarily ad-
vanced by assigning students to schools because of the diversity
of their views. Instead, the precise educational outcome of teach-
ing racial literacy is advanced by assigning meaningful numbers
of racially diverse students to a school or classroom. Racial diver-
sity in the high school environment thus has a particularly mean-
ingful role in fostering the precise objective of teaching racial lit-
89. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
90. Id. at 338.
91. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
92. Id. at 330 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
93. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quoting
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
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eracy.9 4 The educational judgment that racial literacy is best
taught in a racially diverse school environment is not only rea-
sonable; it is virtually undisputed. If a school district has a com-
pelling interest in fostering the educational benefits of a racially
diverse educational environment, then a plan precisely designed
to achieve that environment certainly meets any credible defini-
tion of narrowly tailored.95
2. Absence of Quotas
The second narrow-tailoring factor prohibits the use of quotas
based upon race.96 A quota is defined as "a program in which a
certain fixed number or proportion of opportunities are 'reserved
exclusively for certain minority groups.' Quotas 'impose a fixed
number or percentage which must be attained, or which cannot
be exceeded."'97 Public school districts commonly attempt to
achieve a "meaningful" number of diverse students in an educa-
tional environment by approximating the racial diversity that ex-
ists in the district as a whole.9"
94. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that when
racial diversity is the compelling interest, "[t]he only relevant criterion, then, is a stu-
dent's race; individualized consideration beyond that is irrelevant to the compelling inter-
est"); Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 752 (2d Cir. 2000) ("If re-
ducing racial isolation is-standing alone-a constitutionally permissible goal, . . . then
there is no more effective means of achieving that goal than to base decisions on race.");
see also Jeff Sapp, Cooperative Learning: A Foundation for Race Dialogue, 30 Teaching
Tolerance (Fall 2006), http://www.tolerance.orglteactlmagazine/features.jsp?is=39&ar+
684; Spencer Kagan, The Power to Transform Race Relations, 30 Teaching Tolerance (Fall
2006), http://www.tolerance.org/teach/magazine/features.jsp?is=39&ar=684; Grant, Teach-
ing and Learning About Racial Issues in the Modern Classroom (2003).
95. Reliance on group characteristics is not necessarily unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment:
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may rely on age as a proxy for
other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are relevant to the State's le-
gitimate interests. The Constitution does not preclude reliance on such gen-
eralizations. That age proves to be an inaccurate proxy in any individual case
is irrelevant.
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000).
96. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
97. Id. at 335 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496 (1989)
and Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring and
dissenting in part)) (internal citation omitted).
98. For example, if a'particular Seattle "District school is oversubscribed and 'integra-
tion positive'-i.e., the white or nonwhite student body of the school deviates by plus or
minus 10% or 15% (depending on the school year) of the preferred 40% white/60% non-
white ratio," the District assigns students to a particular school whose presence will move
the racial composition of that school closer to the racial composition of the entire district.
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The districts argued that no quota exists because their race-
conscious school assignment program "does not set aside a fixed
number of slots for nonwhite or white students."99 Yet, the dis-
tricts arguably created a quota when they established the prede-
termined, preferred ratio of white and nonwhite students. In
Bakke, the medical school argued that it did not operate an ad-
missions quota because it did not always meet its goal of filling
its predetermined number of seats."10 Justice Powell rejected that
argument, stating that regardless of whether the preselected
seats were a "quota" or a "goal":
This semantic distinction is beside the point: The special admissions
program is undeniably a classification based on race and ethnic
background. To the extent that there existed a pool of at least mini-
mally qualified minority applicants to fill the 16 special admissions
seats, white applicants could compete only for 84 seats in the enter-
ing class, rather than the 100 open to minority applicants. Whether
this limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on
the basis of race and ethnic status. '
0 1
School districts also have attempted to avoid Grutter's prohibi-
tion against quotas by attempting to classify their predetermined
ratios as a "critical mass."102 Grutter recognized that in order to
achieve its compelling interest in obtaining the educational bene-
fits from a diverse post-secondary school environment, a univer-
sity could strive to enroll a "critical mass" of nonwhite stu-
dents.0 3 The Court stressed that the University could determine
what number of nonwhite admittees would be "meaningful"
enough to achieve its desired educational benefit.0 4 The Court de-
fined a critical mass as "meaningful numbers" and "meaningful
representation" precisely because it recognized that the Univer-
sity could properly determine that some degree of racial balance
would be necessary to achieve the benefits of a diverse educa-
tional environment. 0
5
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1213 (9th Cir.
2005) (Bea, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 1184.
100. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 288 (1978).
101. Id. at 289.
102. See, e.g., Seattle, 426 F.3d at 1184.
103. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333, 335-36.
104. See Seattle, 426 F.3d at 1173 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-33).
105. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318.
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Although the law school's plan did not seek to admit a set
number or percentage of minority students, the law school would
consult "daily reports" that kept track of the racial composition of
the incoming class. 106 As the court in Seattle noted, "the Court [in
Grutter] held that this attention to numbers did not transform
the law school plan into a quota, but instead demonstrated that
the law school sought to enroll a critical mass of minority stu-
dents in order 'to realize the educational benefits of a diverse stu-
dent body."'10 7
A public school district's decision to assign a student to a par-
ticular school or classroom in order to realize these benefits is
neither driven by a quota nor the effort to achieve racial balance
for its own sake. To the contrary, the school seeks to assign a
critical mass of white and nonwhite students in schools in order
to realize its compelling educational interests. 10 A school district
that seeks to maintain a meaningful number of white and non-
white students in each of its high schools does so in order to
achieve its compelling educational interest in fostering the educa-
tional benefits derived from an educational environment with
that "meaningful" number of students from different racial
groups. The Seattle District, for instance, determined meaning-
fulness by adopting the 15 percent plus or minus variance tied to
106. Id.
107. Seattle, 426 F.3d at 1184 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318).
108. Thus, the Court in Seattle concluded: "Although the dissent contends that the 'tie-
breaker aims for a rigid, predetermined ratio of white and nonwhite students,' we believe
it is more appropriately viewed as a 'permissible goal.' Such a goal 'requires only a good
faith effort .. .to come within a range demarcated by the goal itself.'" Id. at 1184 n.28
(quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335).
In fact, the Seattle District's race-conscious assignment process
does not set aside a fixed number of slots for nonwhite or white students in
any of the District's schools. The tiebreaker is used only so long as there are
members of the underrepresented race in the applicant pool for a particular
oversubscribed school. If the number of students of that race who have ap-
plied to that school is exhausted, no further action is taken, even if the 15
percent variance has not been satisfied. That is, if the applicant pool has been
exhausted, no students are required or recruited to attend a particular high
school in order to bring it within the 15 percent plus or minus range for that
year.
Moreover, the number of white and nonwhite students in the high schools
is flexible and varies from school to school and from year to year. This vari-
ance in the number of nonwhite and white students throughout the District's
high schools is because, under the Plan, assignments are based on students'
and parents' preferences. The tiebreakers come into play in the assignment
process only when a school is oversubscribed.
Id. at 1184-85.
[Vol. 42:707
READING, WRITING, AND RACE
demographics of students in the Seattle public schools.10 9 As the
court in Seattle articulated the District's method as:
[Wlhen an oversubscribed high school has more than 75 percent
nonwhite students (i.e., more than 15 percent above the overall 60
percent nonwhite student population) and less than 25 percent white
students, or when it has less than 45 percent nonwhite students (i.e.,
more than 15 percent below the overall 60 percent nonwhite student
population) and more than 55 percent white students, the school is
considered racially concentrated or isolated, meaning that it lacks a
meaningful number of students needed to realize the educational
benefits of a diverse student body.1 10
In their efforts to assign a meaningful number of racially di-
verse students to their schools, some school districts use race in
their assignment process. According to Grutter and Gratz, how-
ever, the use of race in governmental decisions is not itself a con-
stitutional violation. In Grutter, the law school's goal of enrolling
between 12 percent to 20 percent of underrepresented minorities
in a given year was tied to the demographics of its applicant
pool."' Moreover, the use of a school district's overall demograph-
ics as a guide to what constitutes a "meaningful" number of white
and nonwhite students is consistent with traditional standards
employed in both voluntary and court-ordered school desegrega-
tion plans. As the Seattle District's expert testified:
Most of the cases I've participated in... generally worked with num-
bers that reflect the racial composition of the school district but, at
the same time, tr[ied] to allow the district sufficient flexibility so
that it would not have to regularly and repeatedly move students on
a short-term basis simply to maintain some specific number. That's
why we see ranges of plus or minus 15 percent in most cases of school
desegregation.
Indeed, school districts throughout the country commonly de-
termine whether a particular school is "sufficiently desegregated
by looking to the 'population of the district' in question."" 3 Given
109. See id. at 1184.
110. Id. at 1185 (internal quotations omitted).
111. For example, in 1995, 662 (approximately 16%) of the 4,147 University of Michi-
gan Law School applicants were underrepresented minorities; in 1996, 559 (approximately
15%) of the 3,677 law school applicants were underrepresented minorities; in 1997, 520
(approximately 15%) of the 3,429 law school applicants were underrepresented minorities.
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 384 tbl. 1-3 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
112. Seattle, 426 F.3d at 1186.
113. See id.; see also Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2005) (hold-
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
this established conception of "meaningful" numbers of diverse
students in the public high school desegregation context, a school
district's belief that it can achieve the educational benefits of ra-
cial diversity by striving for those numbers is certainly reason-
able. A student assignment plan designed to foster the educa-
tional benefits recognized to flow from meaningful numbers of
white and nonwhite students in a particular school must neces-
sarily attempt to achieve those meaningful numbers.114
3. Race-Neutral Alternatives
In Grutter, the Supreme Court explained that narrow tailoring
"require[s] serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university
seeks."115
The following "race-neutral" alternatives have been suggested
as methods to achieve racial diversity in an educational environ-
ment: (1) student assignment based on socio-economic status; (2)
student assignment based on interest in magnet schools; (3) stu-
dent assignment by lottery; and (4) student assignment based on
a multi-factoral index. 116
a. Socio-Economic Integration Strategies
In the Seattle District, "the northern Seattle area contains a
majority of white students and is historically more affluent."117
The southern Seattle area is necessarily less affluent. "Thus,
moving more affluent students south, and [less affluent] students
ing that a "transfer policy conditioned on district demographics (+/- 10-15%)" was not a
quota because it "reflects the defendants' efforts to obtain the benefits of diversity in a
stable learning environment"); Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 233 F.3d 232,
287-88 (4th Cir. 2000) (Traxler, J., dissenting) (citing DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE:
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 160 (1995), which observed that over [74%] of the
school districts with desegregation plans use a variance of plus or minus [20%] or greater)
(bracketed figures reflect Armor's data); 34 C.F.R. § 280.4(b)(4) (2006) (defining "minority
group isolation" as "a condition in which minority group children constitute more than 50
percent of the enrollment of [the] school").
114. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 ("'[Slome attention to numbers, without more, does
not transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid quota.") (quoting Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978)).
115. Id. at 339 (emphasis added).
116. See Seattle, 426 F.3d at 1177, 1214-15.
117. Id. at 1214 n.23 (Bea, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).
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north, could possibly provide a more diverse student body."1 18
Nonetheless, the Seattle District rejected this alternative because
it found an imprecise correlation between poverty and minority
status, and because it did not want to require students to reveal
their socioeconomic status to their peers." 9 There is great debate
about whether student assignment or admission based on socio-
economic status is an effective race-neutral method of achieving a
racially diverse educational environment. 20 Even if student as-
signment based on socio-economic status might result in racial
diversity, there is no doubt that the use of socio-economic status
is less precisely tailored to achieve the goal of meaningful racial
diversity than the use of racial diversity itself.
b. Magnet Programs Designed to Achieve Integration
In Seattle, the court observed:
[I]n 2000, the Urban League of Metropolitan Seattle presented a
high school assignment plan to the District. The plan proposed that
each neighborhood region in Seattle would have a designated high
school. Students would still be able to apply to any high school in Se-
attle, but when oversubscription occurred, students living in the des-
ignated "reference area" would first be assigned to their regional
high school ahead of those who did not. To avoid racial concentration
in the schools, the plan proposed "merit-based academic, a vocational
and vocational magnet programs."
1 21
According to the dissent in Seattle, "these programs will help
each school address racial diversity issues by encouraging stu-
dents to travel outside of their communities to participate in a
specific magnet program."122
118. Id.
119. See id. at 1188-89.
120. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN ET. AL., EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN
HIGHER EDUCATION, 176-77 (2005); CATHERINE L. HORN & STELLA M. FLORES, THE CWIL
RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, PERCENT PLANS IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE STATES' EXPERIENCES (2003); RICHARD KAHLENBERG,
THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996); Richard Sander, Experiment-
ing with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 471 (1997); Alex MacGillis,
Basing Affirmative Action on Income Changes Payoff, BALT. SUN. May 23, 2003, at 1C;
Mark Satin, Economic-Class-Based Affirmative Action: The Elites Loathe It, the People
Want It, RADIAL MIDDLE NEWSLETTER, July/Aug. 2003, http://www.radicalmiddle.com/x-
affirmative-action.htm.
121. Seattle, 426 F.3d at 1215 (Bea, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Bea, J., dissenting).
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Among the most effective magnet programs in fostering racial
integration involve dual language immersion. These programs at-
tracts an equal number of English speaking students and stu-
dents for whom Spanish is their first language. The magnet may
pull white students away from their geographic attendance zones
and into a school with a significant number of Hispanic or Latino
students for whom English may not be their first language. The
program's goal is foreign-language acquisition, but its methods
may have the collateral benefit of achieving a racially diverse
classroom. Yet, these programs, as well, will not be as finely tai-
lored to achieve the goal of racial diversity. Racial diversity is at
best a collateral benefit of the magnet program.
c. Lottery
Public school districts may always choose to use a lottery to de-
termine which students should be assigned to its oversubscribed
high schools. The lottery alternative assumes that drawing from
this pool would produce a student body in each of the oversub-
scribed schools that approaches the district's overall racial com-
position. These assumptions, however, are not logical. As the Se-
attle experience suggests, the pool of applicants to any
oversubscribed school will necessarily be skewed toward less than
meaningful numbers of diverse students. In the Seattle litigation,
Superintendent Olchefske testified that "District patterns indi-
cate that more people choose schools close to home." 23 The pool of
applicants inevitably would be skewed in favor of the demo-
graphic of the surrounding residential area. Where there is mean-
ingful residential segregation in a district such that non-
geographic student assignment is necessary to achieve meaning-
ful diversity in a particular school, random sampling from such a
racially skewed pool would produce a racially skewed student
body. As one Seattle District Board member testified, a lottery
was not a viable alternative because "if applicants are over-
whelmingly majority and you have a lottery, then your lottery-
the pool of your lottery kids are going to be overwhelmingly ma-
jority. We have a diversity goal." 124
123. Id. at 1190.
124. Id.
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d. Diversity Index
The San Francisco California public school district employs a
program focused on enhancing diversity in the classrooms.12 The
program allows students to choose any school within the dis-
trict. 126 When a school is oversubscribed, the program first as-
signs students with siblings to the same school, and then accom-
modates students with specialized learning needs.127 After that,
the so-called "Diversity Index" is employed. 121 "Under the Diver-
sity Index process, the school district calculates a numerical pro-
file of all student applicants. The current Diversity Index is com-
posed of six binary factors: socioeconomic status, academic
achievement status, mother's educational background, language
status, academic performance index, and home language." 29
Even if the program may result in enhanced diversity, the Su-
preme Court has made clear that "[niarrow tailoring does not re-
quire exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative." 3 '
Furthermore, the school district cannot be required to adopt race-
neutral measures that would force it to sacrifice other educational
values central to its mission. 3' If the compelling interest to be
achieved is meaningful racial diversity within schools in a segre-
gated school district, efforts to achieve that diversity by ignoring
the race of students cannot be as precisely tailored as considering
the race of students in that process. 13 2
There may be school districts in which student assignment
plans based on socio-economic status, magnet schools, lottery, or
index happen to result in a meaningful number of racially diverse
students in a particular school. Yet, while race-neutrality as an
125. David I. Levine, Public School Assignment Methods after Grutter and Gratz: The
View from San Francisco, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511, 531-32 (2003).
126. Id. at 529.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 529-30.
130. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003).
131. See id. at 340.
132. See id. (dismissing the race-neutral alternative of "percentage plans," advocated
by the United States in an amicus brief, because the "United States [did] not.., explain
how such plans could work for graduate and professional schools"); see also Comfort v.
Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that Lynn rejected the use of a
lottery in place of the race-based tiebreaker, and holding that "Lynn must keep abreast of
possible alternatives as they develop, but it need not prove the impracticability of every
conceivable model for racial integration") (internal citation omitted).
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abstract matter may be preferable to race-conscious decisions,
race-neutrality cannot be required where it is not at all tailored to
the interest deemed compelling. Because producing the educa-
tional benefits of racial literacy is a compelling interest, a school
district may permissibly seek that interest if its means are nar-
rowly tailored to achieve that precise interest. A school district
should not be encouraged to conceal its compelling interest of
achieving racial literacy through the use of "some clumsier proxy
device" 133 such as poverty, lottery, magnet schools, or indexes.
Professional educators recognize without refutation that stu-
dent assignment to create meaningful numbers of racially diverse
students in a school or classroom is precisely tailored to the com-
pelling interest in teaching racial literacy. According to the Ninth
Circuit, the Seattle District established that racial diversity in
secondary education produces a number of compelling educa-
tional benefits. 13 4 Experts testified that in racially diverse
schools, "both white and minority students experienced improved
critical thinking skills-the ability to both understand and chal-
lenge views which are different from their own." 35
As the District's expert explained:
[Tihe social science research "clearly and consistently shows that, for
both white and minority students, a diverse educational experience
results in improvement in race-relations, the reduction of prejudicial
attitudes, and the achievement of a more.., inclusive experience for
all citizens .... The research further shows that only a desegregated
and diverse school can offer such opportunities and benefits. The re-
search further supports the proposition that these benefits are long
lasting." 1
36
The Seattle District's expert also noted that "'research shows that
a[ I desegregated educational experience opens opportunity net-
works in areas of higher education and employment .. . [and]
strongly shows that graduates of desegregated high schools are
more likely to live in integrated communities than those who do
133. See Comfort, 418 F.3d at 29 (Boudin, J., concurring).
134. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1174-
77 (9th Cir. 2005); see also sources cited supra note 9.
135. Id. at 1174 (internal quotations omitted).
136. Id. at 1174-75.
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not, and are more likely to have cross-race friendships later in
life.,,,13
7
In the Seattle litigation, the fact that a diverse secondary
school environment produces educational benefits was not dis-
puted. "Even Parents' expert conceded that '[t]here is general
agreement by both experts and the general public that integra-
tion is a desirable policy goal mainly for the social benefit of in-
creased information and understanding about the cultural and
social differences among various racial and ethnic groups."' 138 In
fact, the dissent in the Seattle litigation acknowledged
[tlhe idea that children will gain social, civic, and perhaps educa-
tional skills by attending schools with a proportion of students of
other ethnicities and races, which proportion reflects the world in
which they will move, is a notion grounded in common sense. It may
be generally, if not universally, accepted. 1
39
137. Id. at 1175 (alterations in original). The District's compelling interests in diversity
also have been endorsed by Congress. In the Magnet Schools Assistance Act, Congress
found that "[i]t is in the best interests of the United States-(A) to continue the Federal
Government's support of local educational agencies that are.., voluntarily seeking to fos-
ter meaningful interaction among students of different racial and ethnic backgrounds, be-
ginning at the earliest stages of such students' education; (B) to ensure that all students
have equitable access to a high quality education that will prepare all students to function
well in a technologically oriented and a highly competitive economy comprised of people
from many different racial and ethnic backgrounds." 20 U.S.C. § 7231(a)(4)(A)-(B) (em-
phasis added).
138. Seattle, 426 F.3d at 1175 (alteration in original). Research has shown that inter-
group contact reduces prejudice and supports the values of citizenship. See Black, supra
note 9, at 951-52 (collecting academic research demonstrating that interpersonal interac-
tion in desegregated schools reduces racial prejudice and stereotypes, improving students'
citizenship values and their ability to succeed in a racially diverse society in their adult
lives); see also supra notes 5 & 8.
139. Seattle, 426 F.3d at 1196 (Bea, J., dissenting); see also Comfort, 418 F.3d at 14-16
(holding that the "negative consequences of racial isolation that Lynn seeks to avoid and
the benefits of diversity that it hopes to achieve" constituted compelling interests) ("In
fact, there is significant evidence in the record that the benefits of a racially diverse school
are more compelling at younger ages."); Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212
F.3d 738, 752 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that "a compelling interest can be found in a program
that has as its object the reduction of racial isolation and what appears to be de facto seg-
regation"), superseded on other grounds as stated in Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d
163, 171 n.7 (2d Cir. 2001); Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 738
F.2d 574, 579 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[W]e held that the Board's goal of ensuring the continuation
of relatively integrated schools for the maximum number of students, even at the cost of
limiting freedom of choice for some minority students, survived strict scrutiny as a matter
of law."); McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 851 (W.D. Ky.
2004) (concluding that voluntary maintenance of the desegregated school system was a
compelling state interest and the district could consider race in assigning students to com-
parable schools), affd, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005) (per curium); Comfort v. Lynn School
Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 356 (D. Mass. 2003) (noting expert testimony describing ra-
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The Supreme Court, as well, has recognized the educational
benefits of a racially diverse student population. 140
When producing the educational advantages of a racially di-
verse school is the compelling interest, there is no more effective
means than a consideration of race to achieve that interest. Even
the expert called by parents opposed to the district's plan was
forced to concede the logic of that plan: "[I1f you don't consider
race, it may not be possible to offer an integrated option to
students .... [Ihf you want to guarantee it you have to consider
race." 141 As the Seattle court concluded: "The logic is self-evident:
When racial diversity is a principal element of the school district's
compelling interest, then a narrowly tailored plan may explicitly
take race into account."'42
cial stereotyping as a "habit of mind' that is difficult to break once it forms" and explain-
ing that "[i]t is more difficult to teach racial tolerance to college-age students; the time to
do it is when the students are still young, before they are locked into racialized thinking");
Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 HOw. L.J. 705, 755 (2004) ("[I]f 'diminish-
ing the force of [racial] stereotypes' is a compelling pedagogical interest in elite higher
education, it can only be more so in elementary and secondary schools-for the very prem-
ise of Grutter's diversity rationale is that students enter higher education having had too
few opportunities in early grades to study and learn alongside peers from other racial
groups.") (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003)) (alterations in the origi-
nal) (emphasis added); see also supra notes 5 & 9.
140. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 480, 487 (1982) (holding
unconstitutional the state initiative that blocked the Seattle School District's use of man-
datory busing to remedy de facto segregation); Bustop, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Los Angeles,
439 U.S. 1380, 1383 (1978) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (denying a request to stay imple-
mentation of a voluntary desegregation plan and noting that there was "very little doubt"
that the Constitution at least permitted its implementation); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189, 242 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("School boards
would, of course, be free to develop and initiate further plans to promote school desegrega-
tion .... Nothing in this opinion is meant to discourage school boards from exceeding
minimal constitutional standards in promoting the values of an integrated school experi-
ence."); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (stating that
school authorities "are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and imple-
ment educational policy and might well conclude ... that in order to prepare students to
live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white
students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole"); N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971) ("[A]s a matter of educational policy school authorities may
well conclude that some kind of racial balance in the schools is desirable quite apart from
any constitutional requirements.").
141. Seattle, 426 F.3d at 1191 (omissions and alterations in original). As Superinten-
dent Olchefske stated, "'when diversity, meaning racial diversity, is part of the educational
environment we wanted to create, I think our view was you took that issue head on and
used-you used race as part of the structures you developed.'" Id.
142. Id. (citing Hunter v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999))
(upholding as narrowly tailored the admissions policy of an elementary school--operated
as a research laboratory-that explicitly considered race in pursuit of a racially balanced
research sample).
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4. Undue Harm
The fourth narrow-tailoring factor requires that the District's
use of the racial tiebreaker "not 'unduly burden individuals who
are not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups."'143 A
narrowly tailored plan ensures that no member of any racial
group is unduly harmed. 1" Opponents of district assignment
plans argue that every student who is denied his or her choice of
schools because of the integration-assignment goals suffers a con-
stitutionally significant burden. Public school students, however,
have no constitutional right to attend any particular school
within a district. 145
Moreover, the use of race in student assignment does not uni-
formly benefit one race to the detriment of another. Under stu-
dent assignment plans designed to attain meaningful numbers of
racially diverse students, white students will be given preference
over nonwhite students in some schools and at other schools,
nonwhite students are given preference over white students.
146
Accordingly, school districts are entitled to assign all students to
any of their schools, no student is entitled to attend any specific
school, and the use of race in student assignment cannot uni-
formly benefit any race or group of individuals to the detriment of
another.
143. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630
(1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
144. See id.
145. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 408 (1986) (White, J., concurring) ("School
boards customarily have the power to create school attendance areas and otherwise desig-
nate the school that particular students may attend."); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27,
31-32 (1885) (stating that public education is squarely within the state's traditional police
powers); Comfort, 418 F.3d at 20 ("The denial of a transfer under the [District's] Plan is..
. markedly different from the denial of a spot at a unique or selective educational institu-
tion.").
146. For instance, in Seattle:
[I]n the 2000-01 school year, 89 more white students were assigned to Frank-
lin, one of Seattle's most popular schools, than would have been assigned ab-
sent the tiebreaker; 107 more nonwhite students were assigned to Ballard,
another of Seattle's most popular schools, than would have been assigned ab-
sent the tiebreaker; 27 more nonwhite students were assigned to Nathan
Hale than would have been assigned absent the tiebreaker; and 82 more
nonwhite students were assigned to Roosevelt than would have been absent
the tiebreaker.
Seattle, 426 F.3d at 1192.
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5. Sunset Provision
The fifth and final narrow-tailoring factor requires a public
school district's race-conscious student assignment to "be limited
in time," and "have a logical end point."147 A workable "sunset"
provision within any government-operated racial classification is
vital:
"[A] core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with
all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race."
The requirement that all race-conscious admissions programs
have a termination point "assure[s] all citizens that the deviation
from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a
temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal of
equality itself."14
8
Under Grutter, "this durational requirement can be met by 'pe-
riodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still
necessary to achieve student body diversity.""49 School districts
constantly monitor and review their student assignment plans
and enrollment figures. They also employ numerous forms of
standardized tests and authentic assessments to determine
whether their instructional practices are producing the desired
learning outcomes. To the extent the monitored data shows that
racial literacy is not produced in a racially diverse educational
environment, the public school district will be able to make the
data driven decision to alter its instructional practices. If the data
reveals that racial literacy acquisition increases in a racially di-
verse environment, then secondary students will acquire that
competency. Perhaps the most effective method of hastening the
arrival of the day when race-conscious decisions by public school
officials are no longer necessary is to ensure that secondary
school students are taught racial literacy.
147. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.
148. Id. at 341-42 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) and City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989) (alteration in original)).
149. Seattle, 426 F.3d at 1192 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342).
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III. EDUCATIONAL STRATEGIES BY PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS
DESIGNED TO TEACH RACIAL LITERACY ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
UNDER AUTHENTIC STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION
As demonstrated in Section II of this article, a public school
district's race-conscious school assignment decisions can survive
current constitutional standards of strict scrutiny where they are
narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest in teaching
racial literacy.
Under a strict scrutiny regime, however, the Supreme Court
could as readily determine that a school district's educational ob-
jectives are not "compelling" or that the school district's educa-
tional strategies are not "narrowly tailored" to achieve their ob-
jectives. Such a judicial determination is possible because the
Supreme Court's equal protection doctrine presumes that any
race-conscious decisions by governmental officials are unconstitu-
tional, unless the government can affirmatively convince the
Court that its interests are "compelling" and its means are suffi-
ciently tailored to achieve those interests. As demonstrated in
this Section, the Court's presumption that race-conscious deci-
sions are violative of "equal protection" is contrary to any authen-
tic understanding of the Equal Protection Clause and the princi-
ple of equality on which it is based.
A. The Supreme Court's Presumption that Race-Conscious
Decisions Violate the Principle of Equality is Unfounded
The Court's doctrinal presumption that race-conscious govern-
mental action is unconstitutional has a dubious lineage. The Su-
preme Court's three-tiered Equal Protection Clause analysis 150
evolved from the Court's suspicion that legislation classifying
persons based on race was designed to disadvantage members of
a racial minority.15' Under that analysis, a government educa-
tional program that affects a "suspect class," like an underrepre-
sented racial minority, will be strictly scrutinized to determine
150. See supra note 16.
151. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see also Lucy
Katz, Public Affirmative Action and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Fragmentation of
Theory after City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co. and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 17 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 317, 339 (1992).
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whether it violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 15 2 The source for
such heightened scrutiny is often traced to footnote four in United
States v. Carolene Products'53 Yet, that footnote was designed at
most to suggest exceptions to the presumption of constitutionality
usually given to legislation. 5 4 The Carolene Products Court cau-
tioned that the presumption of constitutionality may be "nar-
rower" where the challenged legislation is within a "specific pro-
hibition of the Constitution," or where the law "restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about the repeal of undesirable legislation" or is "directed at par-
ticular religious, [ ] national, or racial minorities," or "discrete
and insular minorities.' 55
While the Court questioned whether "exacting judicial scru-
tiny" might be appropriate in these circumstances, it never sug-
gested overturning the presumption that legislation is constitu-
tionally valid. The Court did not remotely suggest that legislation
be presumed unconstitutional even in the situations it identified
as exceptional. Nevertheless, under the "strict scrutiny" standard
developed since Carolene Products, any state regulation that clas-
sifies people based on their race is presumed to violate the Equal
Protection Clause; that presumption is unassailable unless the
state can show that the challenged law is finely tailored to
achieve a compelling or substantial state interest.'56 Accordingly,
in Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court reaffirmed that any governmental
program that classifies persons based on race is presumed to vio-
152. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 560-61
(1982) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980)); cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
11 (1967) ("'[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry [are] odious to a
free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality'" (quoting Hiraba-
yashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 ("all legal re-
strictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect").
153. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 495 (1989); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978).
154. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4; see also JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-77 (1980) (expanding upon the footnote's suggestions to
create a theory of judicial review based upon the Court's role in protecting the democratic
political process).
155. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (internal citations omitted).
156. E.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 326 (2003). See generally Angelo N. Ancheta, Contextual Strict Scrutiny and Race-
Conscious Policy Making, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 21 (2004).
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late the Equal Protection Clause, even if it is designed to assist a
"suspect class. '"157
The Court's presumption that race-conscious decisions are un-
constitutional not only has a questionable precedential founda-
tion, it is contrary to the principle of equality itself. As Aristotle
fully understood, his maxim that like cases should be treated in a
like manner, and that unlike cases should be treated in an unlike
manner15 8 requires both a descriptive analysis of the "likeness" of
citizens and a normative analysis of the propriety of their treat-
ment by the law.15 9 Even if a regime presumes that all persons
are entitled by their nature to equal protection of the laws, impor-
tant judgments about which cases are in fact alike and therefore
should be treated alike cannot be resolved without standards in-
dependent of equality.
Once these judgments are made, however, the equality maxim
appears to call into question laws that treat like cases in an
unlike manner. Presuming the constitutionality of laws that treat
like cases in a like manner seems to be consistent with the equal-
ity maxim. Yet, the equality maxim also appears to question laws
that treat unlike cases in a like manner; the maxim should lead
to a presumption against the constitutionality of those laws. Laws
that treat like cases in a like manner and unlike cases in an
unlike manner should enjoy a presumption of constitutionality
under the equality principle.
In a seminal series of publications, Professor Peter Westen
shows that Aristotle's principle of equality is circular, 6 0 and can-
not be employed to resolve any jurisprudential question without
reference to "substantive" values or rights wholly apart from
equality itself.'61 Professor Westen dissects each part of the Aris-
157. 539 U.S. at 270.
158. See Westen, supra note 152, at 543 (citing ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
1131a-1131b (Sir David Ross trans. 1925)).
159. Aristotle recognized that each regime would have to reach the political judgment
about whether its citizens were "like" or "unalike." He understood that linking justice with
equality begged the political question of the relevance of similarities and differences: "all
men agree that what is just in distribution must be according to merit in some sense
though they do not all specify the same sort of merit." ARISTOTLE, supra note 158, at
1131a.
160. Westen acknowledges that this insight into the circular nature of "equality" is not
new. Indeed, he posits that Aristotle's equality maxim has had staying power partly be-
cause it expresses an unassailable tautology. Westen, supra note 152, at 572-78.
161. Westen, supra note 152, at 561; see also PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY:
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totelian equality principle. First, the formula requires a determi-
nation of whether two or more persons are, or should be deemed,
alike for the purpose of applying the equality principle.' 62 Be-
cause no two persons are truly alike, that determination depends
on a judgment about the relevance of the undeniable differences
between people. People are alike only if their differences are
judged irrelevant by some external standard. 163
Second, Westen shows that "treatments can be alike only in
reference to some moral rule."16 4 The same moral rule or inde-
pendent legal standard that determines the relevance of people's
similarities and dissimilarities also determines whether people
should or should not be treated alike under the law. A law cannot
be judged, therefore, by the extent to which it treats people
equally. Westen concludes that the constitutional concept of equal
protection under the law is "an empty vessel with no substantive
moral content of its own."' 65 Accordingly, an idea of justice based
solely on the principle of equality is meaningless without "sub-
stantive moral or legal standards that determine what is one's
'due." 6 6
Shortly after Westen authored his seminal work, a host of
scholars feverishly attempted to inject some independent mean-
ing into the idea of equality.167 Westen, however, effectively dis-
carded these arguments. 16 More recently, Professors Christopher
AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF "EQUALITY" IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE
(1990) [hereinafter SPEAKING OF EQUALITY]; Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in
Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604 (1983) [hereinafter Westen
Reply].
162. Westen, supra note 152, at 543.
163. See id. at 544-45.
164. Id. at 547.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 557. Any principle of justice based on this empty idea of equality is vacuous
as well. The foundation of justice is "giving every person his due." Id. at 556. The equality
principle's declaration that persons who are alike should be treated alike indicates that
treating people equally means giving them their "due." To argue that justice requires that
persons who are alike should be treated alike, therefore, has no genuine meaning unless
the argument contains some moral basis for determining whether they are alike in such a
way as to make morally proper their similar treatment. Id. at 557.
167. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense ofEquality: A Reply to Professor Westen,
81 MICH. L. REV. 575 (1983); William Cohen, Is Equal Protection Like Oakland? Equality
as a Surrogate for Other Rights, 59 TUL. L. REV. 884 (1985); Anthony D'Amato, Is Equality
a Totally Empty Idea?, 81 MICH. L. REV. 600 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the
Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1983).
168. See generally Westen Reply, supra note 161.
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Peters and Kent Greenawalt have tried to resurrect the principle
of equality.
Professor Peters argues that the principle of "prescriptive
equality" is not meaningless. Under this principle, the bare fact
that a person has been treated in a certain way is a reason in it-
self for treating another, identically situated person in the same
way."'69 Once it is determined that two persons are identically
situated, Peters contends, the equality principle has meaning be-
cause it requires their identical treatment. 7 ° Peters concedes,
however, that if this prescriptive principle does have any mean-
ing, that meaning is misguided because it may lead to treating
equals equally, even if that treatment is unjust. 17' For example,
Professor Peters imagines a situation in which eleven drowning
people compete for only ten available spots on a lifeboat. 172 Be-
cause prescriptive equality demands that all of them be treated
equally, none of them may receive spots in the lifeboat and all of
them equally may drown.'73 Accordingly, Peters concludes that
the principle of equality is either irrelevant or harmful when
there are conditions of scarcity.174
Professor Greenawalt agrees with Peters that the principle of
equality does not always lead to "right action."'75  Still,
Greenawalt contends that the equality principle has presumptive
force because it "might pull some people to treat equals equally,
although other considerations would suggest a different out-
come." 76 For example, the principle of equality creates a pre-
sumption favoring equal distributions of lifeboat spots, but that
presumption may be rebutted by stronger values, like saving
lives. 177
These scholars' efforts to resurrect the equality principle ulti-
mately are unavailing. First, as Westen established in anticipat-
ing these efforts, any judicial allegiance to a deeply rooted pre-
169. Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1223 (1997).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1229.
172. See id. at 1237.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1238.
175. Kent Greenawalt, "Prescriptive Equality: Two Steps Forward, 110 HARv. L. REV.
1265, 1277 (1997).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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sumption favoring equal treatment is ultimately indeterminate
and obfuscates judgments independent of equality. 17' The equal-
ity principle cannot support a presumption opposing laws that
treat persons differently because all laws treat some people dif-
ferently from others for some purposes. Second, and more impor-
tantly, the Court's presumption favoring equal treatment for all
is inconsistent with the maxim of equality itself. Once again, the
equality principle requires not only that like cases be treated in a
like manner, but also that unlike cases be treated in an unlike
manner.
Absent from the debate about the meaning of equality is any
serious discussion of whether cases are in fact alike. Greenawalt,
Peters, and even Westen focus their attention on the presumption
favoring the like treatment of like cases. They assume that the
cases at issue are alike, and question whether the law treats
them in a like manner. 179 Hence, Peters' arguments about the
possible injustice of treating like cases in a like manner (i.e., all
drowning persons are treated the same, but they all die), do not
question the basis for determining whether the cases are, in fact,
"alike."" ° Greenawalt also argues that deeply rooted feelings fa-
vor like treatment, but only after it is determined that the cases
at issue are in fact alike.' Yet, the equality maxim contains ab-
solutely no presumption favoring like treatment. To the contrary,
that maxim demands unlike treatment where it is determined
that the persons affected by the treatment are, in fact, not alike.
As Westen shows, the question of whether individuals are
"alike" cannot be answered by the principle of equality, but de-
pends on standards anterior to equality." 2 Because no two per-
sons are alike, the judicial system must create a mechanism for
determining the significance of differences among individuals.
The mechanism must have a descriptive and a normative compo-
nent. The descriptive component provides a legitimate method of
assessing actual, real-world conditions of relevant difference. The
normative component provides a legitimate method of assessing
which differences should be recognized as morally significant.
178. Westen, supra note 152, at 571-75.
179. Id. at 572-74; Greenawalt, supra note 175, at 1289; Peters, supra note 169, at
1260.
180. See Peters, supra note 169, at 1237-43.
181. Greenawalt, supra note 175, at 1273.
182. See Westen, supra note 152, at 571-72.
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The moral or normative proposition that all men are created
equal, for instance, may help to explain the presumption that all
individuals are like cases and thus should receive like treatment.
Yet, that normative proposition is not a descriptive one. In fact,
the premise that all men are created equal says nothing about
whether individuals are in fact "alike" for any particular purpose.
The premise that all individuals should be treated equally regard-
less of race or gender permeates the Supreme Court's Equal Pro-
tection Clause jurisprudence. That premise, however, obfuscates
the fact that individuals are not in fact alike, and creates the un-
founded presumption favoring laws that treat unlike cases as if
they were alike. Only by ignoring even undisputed facts does the
Court presume a lack of racial difference in education.' 3
183. The racial differences in educational opportunities, facilities, and outcomes are
undisputed by all credible researchers. See, e.g., MICHAEL KAUFMAN, EDUCATION LAW,
POLICY AND PRACTICE 414, 441, 442, 526-32 (2005). Ironically, the Court is careful to con-
sider relevant facts when it conducts its far less exacting review of legislation under the
rational basis standard. Even in facial equal protection challenges to legislation, the Su-
preme Court has made clear that rational basis analysis cannot be conducted without con-
sidering the factual circumstances surrounding the legislation. In Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 632-33 (1996), the Supreme Court reviewed the factual circumstances surround-
ing Colorado's enactment of a constitutional amendment that precluded governmental ac-
tion designed to enable persons of gay, lesbian, or bisexual orientation to pursue legal
claims. Significantly, the Court explained that when a governmental enactment passes the
rational basis test, it does so because the Court has found that the law is "grounded in a
sufficient factual context for [the Court] to ascertain some relation between the classifica-
tion and the purpose it served." Id. (emphasis added).
The Court first weighed the facts leading up to the legislature's decision to enact the
amendment, including the "impetus for the amendment and the contentious campaign"
that preceded its adoption. Id. at 623. The Court next considered evidence presented to the
lower courts of the "ultimate effect" and consequences of the amendment. Id. at 627.
Third, the Court considered the full array of legal and social protections available in the
state to persons who are not members of the group singled out for different treatment. Id.
at 627-30. Finally, the Court's factual analysis led it to conclude that the amendment was
"discontinuous with the reasons offered for it." Id. at 632. The Supreme Court did not con-
sider Colorado's several rationales for its amendment in a vacuum. Rather, the Court as-
sessed those justifications in the light of their "factual context." Id. at 632-33, 635. After
reviewing that "factual context," the Supreme Court determined that it could not "credit"
Colorado's explanations for its enactment. Id. at 635. The Court found the reality of record
to be "so far removed" from the claimed basis for the amendment as to "belie" those
claimed basises. Id. From the lack of any connection between the proffered justifications
for the amendment and the factual circumstances surrounding the amendment, the Court
reached the "inevitable inference" that the "disadvantage imposed is born of animosity to-
ward the class of persons affected." Id. at 634. Romer is consistent with a strong line of
Supreme Court authority that rejects any effort to divorce rational basis review from real-
ity--even in facial challenge cases.
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B. The Supreme Court's Presumption That Racial Differences Do
Not Exist in Education is Unfounded
Westen's most important contribution to serious thought about
equality may well be his critique of the abuses of the "equality"
principle in legal and political discourse surrounding the Consti-
tution's Equal Protection Clause.' 4 Once it is conceded that the
Equal Protection Clause does not require all persons to be treated
alike, that clause, like the equality principle itself, cannot be in-
terpreted without relying upon a legal or moral standard anterior
to equality. Even scholars who doubt Westen's premise that
equality is meaningless cannot deny his assertion that many ju-
dicial interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause rely on the
empty rhetoric of equality to support otherwise unexamined and
unsupportable presumptions.'8 5 This insight is particularly help-
ful in understanding the Supreme Court's equal protection deci-
sions regarding race-conscious educational programs, and in any
attempt to correct the Court's flawed logic.
The Court has slighted undisputed racial differences between
students that warrant differential treatment under the law, from
the apparent remediation of the racially discriminatory educa-
tional policies in Brown v. Board of Education8 6 to the apparent
assistance for racial minorities in Grutter8 7 and Gratz. 1
88
Brown cannot be justified by the equality principle alone. The
Court declared that racially segregated educational facilities are
"inherently unequal";189 however, as Westen shows, there is no
such thing as "inherent" inequality.' 90 The actual reasoning of
Brown is that state laws that impose racial segregation in public
education violate the Equal Protection Clause because they injure
African-American school children. 191 Under this logic, even if such
184. The Equal Protection Clause in the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that "no State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
185. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 167, at 902 (arguing that judges use equality as a ra-
tionale for deciding cases which are really based on other substantive values in order to
"avoid larger issues").
186. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
187. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
188. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
189. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
190. Westen, supra note 152.
191. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
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laws were to provide equal educational resources, they would
nevertheless be unconstitutional because they would have a "det-
rimental effect" on African-American students by perpetuating
stereotypes harmful to African-American students: (1) they rein-
force a stigma of inferiority; (2) they generate a feeling of lesser
status; (3) they retard the mental and educational development of
African-American students; and (4) they deny to African-
American students the educational benefits of attending a ra-
cially integrated school. 1
92
On a fundamental level, Brown assumed that African-
American children were "like" white children in their right to be
free from the "injury" of segregated schools or from being denied
the opportunity to attend a diverse school.'93 But, Brown can be
understood only by looking to these important substantive values
apart from equality. The notion that African-American students
should be treated just like white students is used to legitimize the
reality that their educational opportunities are not at all alike.
The misuse of equality also is evident in the Court's decisions
regarding the constitutionality of race-conscious school admis-
Sions policies, presumably intended to assist racial minorities.
Justice Powell's touchstone opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke begins with the assertion that "equal protec-
tion cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and
something else when applied to a person of another color."194 Yet,
as Westen shows, equal protection always means one thing when
applied to one individual, and something else when applied to an-
other individual, if those two individuals are adjudged to be dif-
ferent in a relevant respect.'95 Indeed, Justice Powell himself in-
dicates that "the attainment of a diverse student body" is a
compelling interest that justifies the treatment of one race differ-
ently from another. 196
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Justice Powell's view in Grutter
v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, cases involving the admis-
sions policies at the University of Michigan and its law school.'97
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978).
195. Westen, supra note 152.
196. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
197. 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003); 539 U.S. 244, 270-72 (2003).
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The Court recognized that when it strictly scrutinizes all govern-
mental "use[s] of race," it does so in order to take "relevant" dif-
ferences between the races into account.' 98 The Court acknowl-
edges that "[ciontext matters" and not every "decision influenced
by race is equally objectionable."'99 In other words, African-
American applicants to college and graduate school may not be
"like" white applicants to college and graduate school because Af-
rican-American students may bring an element of diversity to the
educational institution different from that brought by a white
student.
Yet, because all governmental programs treat some people dif-
ferently from others, the question again reduces to whether the
Supreme Court is willing to legitimize the distinction made be-
tween applicants. In Grutter, the Court recognizes that the Uni-
versity of Michigan has valuable reasons for treating applicants
of one race differently from those of another, reasons which sur-
vive strict scrutiny. As discussed in the first section of this article,
however, the Supreme Court has found only two political values
to be so compelling as to justify governmental policies which treat
persons differently because of their race: (1) remedying past dis-
crimination against members of a racial minority; and (2) attain-
ing a diverse student body.2"0 Reduced to the equality principle,
the Court indicates that African-American students are like
white students in every other circumstance except victimization
by specific, proven, past acts of racial injury and the capacity to
bring diversity. Yet, the Court presumes that white students are
otherwise like non-white students in their educational opportuni-
ties.
Suppose the Court did acknowledge that the educational oppor-
tunities available to African-American students are different from
those available to white students because of their different his-
tory of injury from a legally enforced "racial caste system" in edu-
cation, their different condition of injury from "conscious and un-
conscious race bias," their different condition of injury from
educational segregation, and their different condition of injury
from inadequate educational resources. In her dissent in Gratz,
Justice Ginsburg recognizes that, "[o]ur jurisprudence ranks race
198. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
199. Id.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 27-31.
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a 'suspect' category, 'not because [race] is inevitably an impermis-
sible classification, but because it is one which usually, to our na-
tional shame, has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining ra-
cial inequality.'' Put another way, racial classifications should
not be presumed to be "impermissible" where they are designed to
eradicate rather than to maintain the actual condition of racial
inequality. Governmental programs that treat races differently
are not invalid under the Constitution if there is a legitimate de-
termination that the races are in fact different. For Justice Gins-
burg, the starting point for a serious Equal Protection Clause
analysis is whether the individuals who are affected by a gov-
ernmental program are in fact different.
C. The Presumption Against Educational Programs That
Differentiate Based on Race is Contrary to Authentic
Principles of Equality and Equal Protection
Genuine allegiance to the equality maxim in interpreting the
Equal Protection Clause would lead courts to four analytical pa-
rameters.
First, governmental action that treats persons differently
would be unconstitutional where those persons are determined to
be the same. For example, a governmental program that allows
only white students to attend a state law school would be uncon-
stitutional because it treats white students differently from non-
white students where such students are determined to be the
same.20 2 Similarly, as the court held in Frontiero v. Richardson, 3
a Congressional scheme that gave servicemen the benefit of
claiming their spouses as medical dependents but denied that
benefit to servicewomen constituted an "unconstitutional dis-
crimination against servicewomen."204 In his plurality opinion,
Justice Brennan concluded that gender should be a "suspect
class" and that the statute's classification of gender in the inter-
201. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Norwalk Core v. Nor-
walk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1968)).
202. See, e.g., Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948) (Equal Protection
Clause requires Oklahoma to provide some codes to in-state legal education to both black
and white students); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938) (holding
that the state's provision of legal education within the state for white students only vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause).
203. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
204. Id. at 679.
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est of administrative convenience could not be sustained."' In his
concurrence, Justice Powell (together with Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Blackman) resisted the inclusion of women within
"suspect classes," but agreed that the statute created an unconsti-
tutional distinction between men and women without a rational
basis.20 6 Significantly, although Justice Brennan forcefully ar-
gued for giving women "suspect class" status, he concluded ulti-
mately that the statute at issue would fail the rational basis
standard as well.20 7 Justice Brennan contends that "any statutory
scheme which draws such a sharp line between the sexes, solely
for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience, neces-
sarily commands 'dissimilar treatment for men and women who
are ... similarly situated,' and therefore involves the 'very kind of
arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitution]. ' ' 2°s
The Equal Protection Clause thus prohibits treating women dif-
ferently from men, so long as they are determined to be the
same. 
209
Second, governmental action that treats persons alike who are
determined to be alike would be consistent with the equality
principle within the Equal Protection Clause. For example, a gov-
ernmental program requiring families to pay a user fee for bus
transportation to school treats all families determined to be alike
in their proximity to the school in the same way.210 Similarly, a
state statute that mandates the retirement of public employees at
a certain age treats persons determined to be alike in their age in
the same way. 211
Third, governmental action that treats differently persons who
are determined to be different would also be consistent with the
maxim of equality. In Rostker v. Goldberg,1 2 the Court upheld
the Congressional decision to exclude women from registration for
205. See id. at 688-89 (plurality opinion).
206. See id. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
207. See id. at 684.
208. Id. at 690 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (alteration in original).
209. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555-56 (1996) (holding that the Vir-
ginia Military Institute's refusal to admit women to its unique institution constituted a
denial of equal protection).
210. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 465 (1988) (holding that North
Dakota's requirement of a user fee for school bus transportation did not deny students un-
able to afford the fee equal protection).
211. See Mass. Bd. ofRet. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-17 (1976).
212. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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the draft for military combat positions.213 The Court concluded
that the "'gender classification is not individious, but rather real-
istically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated'
in this case."214 In Schlesinger v. Ballard,215 as well, the Court
upheld a Navy policy that gave females a longer period than
males to attain promotions necessary to continued military ser-
vice. 216 The Court reasoned that "the different treatment of men
and women naval officers . . . reflects, not archaic and overbroad
generalizations, but, instead, the demonstratable fact that male
and female line officers in the Navy are not similarly situated
with respect to opportunities for professional service."217
In Rostker, the Court declared that "[t]he Constitution requires
that Congress treat similarly situated persons similarly, not that
it engage in gestures of superficial equality."2 1  This same logic, of
course, would lead to a presumption of constitutionality for gov-
ernmental programs that treat persons differently because of
their race or gender where racial or gender differences are deter-
mined to exist.
Finally, governmental programs that treat persons alike who
are determined to be different would be unconstitutional, in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause's principal of equality. For in-
stance, a Virginia statue that subjected all voters to a poll tax
would be unconstitutional to the extent it was determined that
persons subjected to that similar tax are in fact dissimilar in a
significant way.219 By that same logic, governmental programs
that treat all persons the same regardless of race would be un-
constitutional where it was determined that there were signifi-
cant racial differences.
As these possibilities demonstrate, a presumption against laws
that treat unlike cases in a like manner is consistent with the
maxim of equality within the Equal Protection Clause. That
maxim certainly does not support the current presumption
against the unconstitutionality of laws that treat students differ-
213. Id. at 83.
214. Id. at 79 (quoting Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981)).
215. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
216. Id. at 506, 510.
217. Id. at 508.
218. 453 U.S. at 79.
219. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Electors, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
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ently based on race unless the Court determines that such stu-
dents are in fact alike. Yet, the Court generally does not perform
any serious analysis of whether the persons affected by the law
are in fact alike. The Carolene Products footnote, which was de-
signed to justify treating some classes differently from others, has
led the Court to presume that those classes should be treated the
same as others. Perhaps the assumption that persons should be
treated the same regardless of race has led the Court to presume
that they are in fact the same. Accordingly, the Court presumes
that governmental programs that classify persons based on race
are unconstitutional absent a showing that the different treat-
ment is finely tailored to achieve a compelling interest. Yet, the
Court never really determines whether the persons treated are in
fact alike. The Court is willing to engage in moral determinations
about whether differential legal treatments are appropriate, but
generally is unwilling to engage in factual determinations about
whether persons affected by governmental programs are actually
different. In fact, the Court has hinted at its ability to do so. In
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County,22 ° the Court de-
clared that, "the Equal Protection Clause does not . . . require
'things which are different in fact . . . to be treated in law as
though they were the same.' 221
Accordingly, as Justice Ginsburg suggests in her dissents in
Adarand and Gratz, to judge educational programs which benefit
African-Americans the same way as programs which injure them
is to ignore the history and contemporary reality of differences in
educational opportunity.222 Although the Court employs the
rhetoric of equality, its holding is really based on its political
judgment that significant racial differences in educational oppor-
tunity should have little constitutional significance.
220. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
221. 450 U.S. at 469 (1981) (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966)); see
also Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313-18
(1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498, 506-07 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1974).
222. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 275-76 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's presumption that race-conscious educa-
tional decisions violate the Equal Protection Clause is based on
its premise that white students and nonwhite students are "alike"
in their educational opportunities. The evidence to the contrary is
overwhelming. Yet, what is more astounding is that the Court is
unwilling to test its presumption by looking at any such evidence.
Nor is it willing to give much deference to lower courts who have
considered such evidence as part of an adversarial process and
determined that racial differences in fact exist in educational op-
portunities. Indeed, the Court may not even defer to the over-
whelming educational judgment of educational experts who un-
derstand that racial differences exist, that teaching racial literacy
is critical, and that racial literacy can best be taught in a class-
room with a meaningful number of diverse students. Rather, the
Court apparently is willing to presume that the educational op-
portunities available to white students are the "same" as those
available to nonwhite students because they should be the same.
The Court's presumptions about race may be aspirational, but
they are not descriptive. Anyone who has had a high school class
in racial literacy would know that.
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